But in an article just published in the journal Nature, three Portuguese theoretical physicists developed a mathematical model capable of providing a way out from this conundrum through the introduction of social diversity - a ubiquitous characteristic of modern social networks - and suggesting that that the act of cooperation may depend on one’s social context/ranking. And in fact, when social diversity was taken into account the numbers of those cooperating increased in direct relation to the system diversity.
Furthermore, cooperation, according to this model, spreads even faster when the act of cooperation is considered more important than the amount given, with these societies presenting also a much fairer distribution of wealth. This new mathematic model for society’s evolution is particularly interesting because not only it shows a logic behind the large numbers of cooperators that we know that exist in all human societies, but also it gives us a glimpse of the principles that can help “pushing” them into a better, fairer, path.
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach used to study (and predict) the evolution of social interactions, in which the study of conflict and decision-making is treated – like its name indicates – as a game. One such example are public good games (or PGG), which are frequently used to study cooperation as they look into social behaviour towards public goods - such as education, free health or even street lightning – those that every one can benefit from, regardless of how much they contribute (or not) to create it.
Here because the individual’s benefits are independent of he/she contribution the most rational and selfish strategy (both in the games and real life) is to chose no-cooperation, what we know does not happen in real life. This is a good example of how difficult it has been to understand and create a theoretical model capable of explaining the emergence and prevalence of cooperation not only among humans but many other species.
What Jorge M. Pacheco and Marta D. Santos (University of Lisbon, Portugal) did - together with Francisco C. Santos (Free University of Brussels, Belgium) - in order to overcome this apparent paradox, was to introduce into PGG, for the first time, a new variant – social diversity – in contrast to the models previously used in which all individuals were equivalent. Social diversity here refers to the characteristics typical of most social networks: the existence of individuals with different numbers and types of social connections, with few very highly connected and most with very few connections.
Since PGG are represented as a mathematical formula, diversity was introduced as a new variable in the equation. Then Santos, Santos and Pacheco used this new altered formula to calculate the percentage of collaborators in the community, in function of population diversity (in PGG this would refer to the number and type of games each individual participated or, in other words, his/her “popularity”). And in fact, it was found, that in populations with high diversity, as diversity increased also did collaboration levels. The way PGG work is that each individual pays a certain amount to play (defectors play but do not pay/cooperate) and in the end profit, which is the total amount gathered in a game, is divided by all players. The reason why diversity increased cooperation had to with the fact that those few individuals with more connections and playing more games (the cooperators) would also have much higher “profits” and their impressive success would lead the other players to imitate their behaviour (even when the behaviour per se did not seem to improve directly their own life) resulting in an exponential increase of cooperation. In the same way, in real life the more connected/popular individuals are emulated, becoming role models and opinion makers.
Equally the model also predicted that even when no-cooperators lead to new no-cooperators (as it happens many times in real life where this kind of behaviour can spread within groups) this will result in less profit, less success and eventually their own self-extinction with only a few sporadic ones left to parasite cooperators.
Furthermore, it was also shown that the increase in cooperation was particularly accelerated when all individuals contributed to the games with the same total contribution, independently of the number of games played. This corresponds, in real life, to saying that if the act of contributing to the public good was seen as more important than the amount contributed, the percentage of collaborators in a community would grew much faster.
Interestingly, the model, when applied in a more economical perspective, also suggests that these communities, with high diversity and where the act of cooperation is what matters, will also have a much fairer wealth distribution.
Although this is obviously a very simple mathematical model and reality will never be as linear, Santos, Santos and Pacheco’s results gives us a total new perspective on how to look at ways of increasing cooperation/altruism and, consequently, also on how to create more successful societies, concerning issues as crucial to our survival as the protection of the environment or fairer social relationships, contributing in this way to the construction of a more peaceful world with less conflict and destruction.
Article: Francisco C. Santos, Marta D. Santos & Jorge M. Pacheco, Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games, Nature 454, 213-216 (10 July 2008) doi:10.1038/nature06940
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So, the entire process works only because a large enough majority believe in its viability to support it and thereby provide benefit. Not perfect, but it illustrates the point. There is no requirement that there be a guarantee or a one-for-one correlation between the charity and the individual receiving the benefit.
However, the model is intuitively correct as far as economics is concerned.
Our understanding of the chemical kinetics and the thermodynamics involved explains this cooperation. I am hesitant now to drop some technical terms because I am newly-charmed by the possibilities.
Reactions can be reversible or irreversible. Further analysis is required. :)
Nor did I, by the way, dispute that cooperation might be a selective advantage. I just think that we should reserve the term selective pressure to the conditions that make something an advantage, or not. Whether group selection works is controversial, but that's another issue. I was just trying to save the terminology of social science from polution by imperialistic natural science ;).
Rense said:
I was just trying to save the terminology of social science from polution by imperialistic natural science ;).
I realize this statement was said (at least half) tongue in cheek. But, I think it's important not to get too bogged down by the fact that different fields use the same words in sometimes wildly different ways. I'm in Mathematics, and lord knows I had to lose my English-intuition a long time ago!
"Cooperation" in the Social Sciences implies far more than it does in Biology. That's OK. Each field has it's definition, and so long as we know what field we're in, we're cool.
Though, for my part, I prefer the Biology definition. Cooperation, like "Rationality", is a too romanticized word in Social Science. A hobby horse of mine is trying to remind Social Scientists that humans are only one more animal on the planet. We aren't that special. As such, studying us the way we study other animals is not a strange idea. It's the right idea. There are limits, obviously, but not as many as most Social Scientist would claim.
But, that would require using much of the same terminology of Biology to describe human action. This is good. The Biological definition of cooperation, I think, is more appropriate to how humans actually cooperate than the Social Science version (or at least the implied rationality that goes with the Social Science version).
[I don't want to sound like I'm harping on Social Science. I just want it to be more firmly based on biology.]
As for Dawkins' "The Selfish Gene" book, I always read it as a work of philosophical advocasy. But, then, he may have promoted it that way after the fact. I don't know. But, from that perspective, it seems perfectly fine. It's viewpoint is not ideal. The word "selfish" is certainly prone to potential misinterpretations. And, he, as a person, can be jarringly "agro". But, the premise was/is powerful (especially for the time it was written). Kin selection becomes more plausible when we consider the genes point of view. If I die to protect my brother (who shares half my genes), the genes "win". It was "selfishly" in their interest to get me to sacrifice myself if he lives to breed. The particular copy of the gene in me "dies", but the copy of it in my brother lives.
A gene can't be selfish the way we can, it's not alive. A copy of me is not me. But a copy of a gene (an exact copy) IS the same as the original. I think this is why kin/group selection arguments, from the gene point of view, can make sense where from the organism point of view they don't. Organisms are alive, can die, and are not equal to their copies/twins/clones.
Again, it's the terminology problem. "Selfish", like "cooperation" or "rationality", can have a weighted meaning. For my part, I try not to take people too literally. The "jist" is what's important.
This is precisely where the problem comes in though. Given the length of time (in humans especially) to raise offspring to the stage where they are self-sufficient and are able to reproduce would suggest that it is sacrificing the young that would be the biologically important thing to do, since they are more readily replaced. An adult that sacrifices themselves for a child condemns them both to death. The only reason this position isn't accepted in today's society, is because society itself has largely come to become the surrogate parent to try and ensure the survival of an individual's offspring.
Even if we consider the example stated where I sacrifice myself for my adult brother, the "selfishness" argument fails since it can't know if my brother is capable of reproducing. It would always make more sense to go with the sure thing (our own ability to reproduce) than to run the risk that the life we were saving was sterile. In addition, the question arises; "which genes"? Since my brother would not possess a complete suite of my genes, (and this is exacerbated with other kin arguments), the point becomes more muddled since there may only be a small percentage of genes I would be sacrificing to protect.
The only point at which kin selection makes sense is when the adult making the sacrifice is beyond the age of reproduction (or has already contributed to the gene pool) and now wants to protect adult offspring to ensure the propagation into the next generation. In my view, this is a much more specific example than the general explanation of kin selection offers.
When other animals are considered, it isn't surprising when one observes that the young are the one's that are often the most expendable.
you make some good points. The first one, in which an adult sacrifices themselves for a child would indeed be a problem. The child would then only have one parent. Raising children takes a long time for our species, and for years kids are "worthless" in terms of their ability to survive on their own. Given an extreme situation where it's either you or your child who must die, and you have to choose, I can see how sacrificing the child makes sense. The child will die either way, you might live to breed again. With other animals, it may not be a problem at all, if their children don't take long to rear.
I think a better position on altruistic vs selfish behavior is a neutral one. In some cases, like with the elderly, it makes sense to sacrifice yourself for your younger kin. Other extreme cases may also hold, but generally, an individual is not looking to die and will try and avoid dying.
My point was simply that Dawkins' selfish-gene view has the potential to add to the discussion a perspective that may be useful, sometimes. But, I'm not a Dawkins-fundamentalist. The individual organism as the unit of selection still rings truer to me than the gene as the unit of selection.
Steve,
No worries. I don't offend easily. I think the first lesson you learn in math is that you are nearly always wrong! And the person who points out where you are wrong is doing you a favor. If my logic is flawed somewhere, I want to know it so I don't make the mistake again. I think the only significant difference between math people and everybody else is their ridiculously high tolerance for failure. :)
But, this time I'll defend modeling with mathematics.
Since ALL models in the sciences omit "real life" information out of necessity, are ANY of them useful? Why? If so, what are the criteria of a good model? These are central questions for those of us doing applied mathematics. And they aren't trivial.
Sometimes the models we have are way too simplistic to be of any value. BUT, sometimes the world is far too complicated for us to discern the underlying and central patterns involved (like your example of the swimmer). A simple (in mathematical terms!) model can "cut through the fat" and highlight a cause, or a key effect. Not all the information in the real world is relevant to the cause and effect relationship, it's just "noise" (like how many fish are in the river, or if they are within 50 miles of a town). Sometimes the extra information that we omit IS relevant, but only in minor ways that would not significantly change the relationship (like the current of the river, or if it's light or dark, if the swimmer had been drinking). In those situations, we accept that the model is not 100% accurate, but that its predictions will be probabilistically relevant and be central to the discussion at hand (is kin selection valid).
Models give us a simple way to visualize what we think is going on. It's like using a story like "The Tragedy of the Commons" in Poli-Sci to highlight the potential for environmental damage caused by a society to a swath of land that is owned by no one. Poker models are quite accurate in modeling the behavior of poker players, but poker is a very complex "social" interaction with a lot of chance and random variables. Some of those variables are included, some aren't.
But, you are dead right to question any attempt to generalize a micro-level model to the behavior happening at the macro-level. The main reason is the idea of the Emergent Property. Sometimes the macro-level behavior has properties that are not obviously related to the underlying micro-level behavior. The classic example is the micro Brain, with all of its neurons, ACh, and goop, and the macro Mind, which we imbue with a near magical quality. There IS a connection, and the mind cannot exist without the brain. But, what the connection is is not as simple as knowing the basics of the micro behavior of the brain.
Strangely, mathematicians tend to agree with your worry, but from a slightly different angle. They are always convinced that scientists are "dumbing" down their mathematical models to make them simpler to understand, and in the process losing important information. Scientist counter claiming that mathematicians just like complexity for complexities sake and aren't in a position to say what is and is not relevant information. (As an example, you should hear what many Mathematicians in private say about Phyisicists. To the rest of the world, Physics is way too math heavy. To many mathematicians, it's "naive".)
I'm actually inclined to agree with the scientists. Math is useful when it's useful. It doesn't always have to be complicated. And it sometimes obscures the point when it is. But, it's a fine line we walk.
[a joke often heard by Physicists is, "physics is like sex, math is like masterbation." Thankfully, Woody Allen unwittingly countered with, "Don't knock masterbation, it's sex with someone I love."]
I realized I had failed to extend the idea regarding kin selection in the direction I had originally intended. The original explanation struck me as too contrived and ultimately "selfish" which didn't make sense in terms of the real world where far too many variables may enter. For example, we may not realize that an individual is kin, or the issue of age or survival potential, etc. In all these cases, the issues only make sense when we take the time to evaluate them which is beyond the scope of behavioral considerations.
It is my contention that the explanation is probably much simpler. When a species has evolved to become more cooperative (as in pack or herd animals, as well as humans), there is a natural tendency to behave selfishly in the sense of looking out for our own best interests, but recognizing that cooperation is the only means by which this can be achieved. As a result, it actually becomes a sort of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" (or like "tit for tat" in game theory).
My comment about the government behaving like a surrogate parent actually tends to lend credence to this perspective. In other words, the behavior is not altruistic at all, because in a cooperative society, there may be a reasonable expectation that someone else may sacrifice themselves for YOUR child. Therefore, there's an implied reciprocity (whether it actually occurs or is a reasonable expectation is irrelevant). What does occur is that there is an implied sense that raising a child is everyone's responsibility to varying degrees. We can see that this attitude is quite strong in our society, so one has to consider what conditions would have given rise to such a philosophical position within a culture.
As game theory tells us we must be prepared to make these choices with imperfect knowledge, the force that drives the cooperation is the fact that these are iterative, so the "altruistic" choice must be based on the possibility of an iterative encounter for which a strategy like "tit for tat" may dominate the applied rationale.
(As for the adult sacrificing for the child, we can easily see that many species recognize this liability which is precisely why they tend to over-produce offspring in the hopes that a few may survive. The issue of altruism only becomes an issue when offspring are much difficult to produce and raise to maturity).
"Rough Sex at 40,000 Leagues Under the Sea" - Scientific American
and
Bizarre Aquatic Creatures Are Secretly "Lesbian Necrophiliacs" - Discover
So we definitely need someone who can linguistically whore it out there for page views!













